virtuous violence: hurting and killing to create, sustain, end, and honor social relationships
alan page fiske and tage shakti rai
assumption of “four fundamental motives that underlie most moral judgment, emotions, and behaviour: unity, hierarchy, equality, and proportionality (Rai and Fiske, 2011).”
I believe each of these “fundamental motives” is a myth
this book. and by extension the theories of its authors, are a good example of the authoritarian agenda, by pushing authoritarian–focused ideas such as “When terrorists attack Americans, the American military strikes back at the terrorists – and at those who harbor them.” and “In World War II, President Truman was advised that exploding atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki was morally necessary in the cost-benefit calculus of winning the war with the fewest American casualties.”
also, the (authoritarian) olympic pantheon is presented as the sole religion of the ancient greeks
could have guessed this by the author’s associations with steven pinker
population is the main driver of war group size and conflict casualties
rahul c. oka et al. 2017
Recent views on violence emphasize the decline in proportions of war groups and casualties to populations over time and conclude that past small-scale societies were more violent than contemporary states. In this paper, we argue that these trends are better explained through scaling relationships between population and war group size and between war group size and conflict casualties. We test these relationships and develop measures of conflict investment and lethality that are applicable to societies across space and time. When scaling is accounted for, we find no difference in conflict investment or lethality between small-scale and state societies. Given the lack of population data for past societies, we caution against using archaeological cases of episodic conflicts to measure past violence.
The proportions of individuals involved in intergroup coalitional conflict, measured by war group size (W), conflict casualties (C), and overall group conflict deaths (G), have declined with respect to growing populations, implying that states are less violent than small-scale societies. We argue that these trends are better explained by scaling laws shared by both past and contemporary societies regardless of social organization, where group population (P) directly determines W and indirectly determines C and G. W is shown to be a power law function of P with scaling exponent X [demographic conflict investment (DCI)]. C is shown to be a power law function of W with scaling exponent Y [conflict lethality (CL)]. G is shown to be a power law function of P with scaling exponent Z [group conflict mortality (GCM)]. Results show that, while W/P and G/P decrease as expected with increasing P, C/W increases with growing W. Small-scale societies show higher but more variance in DCI and CL than contemporary states. We find no significant differences in DCI or CL between small-scale societies and contemporary states undergoing drafts or conflict, after accounting for variance and scale. We calculate relative measures of DCI and CL applicable to all societies that can be tracked over time for one or multiple actors. In light of the recent global emergence of populist, nationalist, and sectarian violence, our comparison-focused approach to DCI and CL will enable better models and analysis of the landscapes of violence in the 21st century.
worth fighting for